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Abstract 
 
Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: 
deterrence and incapacitation.  Disentangling their effects is crucial, since each mechanism 
has different implications for optimal policy setting.  I use the introduction of state add-on 
gun laws, which enhance sentences for defendants possessing a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, to isolate the deterrent effect of incarceration.  Defendants subject 
to add-ons would be incarcerated in the absence of the law change, so any short-term 
impact on crime can be attributed solely to deterrence.  Using cross-state variation in the 
timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 
percent decline in gun robberies within the first three years.  This result is robust to a 
number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to 
other types of crime. 
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I. Introduction 
 
How much does the threat of incarceration deter crime?  The answer to this 
question is of crucial importance in formulating criminal sentencing policies. An increase 
in sentence length for any given crime may reduce the incidence of criminal acts by 
deterring potential offenders, but it also increases the length of time offenders are 
incarcerated and are hence unable to commit additional offenses. Each effect has 
different implications for our crime prevention and punishment system. Distinguishing 
between these two effects - the deterrence effect and the incapacitation effect - is one of 
the most challenging problems in the economics of crime. This paper seeks to isolate the 
deterrent effect of sentencing by exploiting variation in penalties induced by add-on gun 
laws.  This approach adds to previous deterrence research and is the first to analyze a 
repeated natural experiment on a national scale. 
Add-on gun laws stipulate sentence enhancements for defendants convicted of 
possessing of a firearm while committing a crime.  This type of law grew popular in the 
United States in the 1970s and 80s, with 30 states adopting one of these laws by 1996 
(Vernick and Hepburn, 2003).  Add-on gun laws provide a unique set of natural 
experiments that can be used to distinguish the deterrent effect of incarceration from the 
incapacitative effect.  The key to the approach in this paper is the fact that add-on laws 
apply only to defendants who would otherwise receive sentences of incarceration.  Thus 
the short-term impact of an add-on gun law should be purely deterrent.   
For concreteness, consider the change in the gun robbery rate between the month 
before and the month after an add-on gun law goes into effect, in a jurisdiction where 
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robbery carries a sentence of 5 years and the add-on is 3 years.  After the law change, 
criminals convicted of gun robbery will now receive 8 year sentences instead of 5.  If 
there is no deterrent effect of the add-on law, there will be no difference in the number of 
defendants newly incarcerated the month before the introduction of the add-on law and 
the month after. Thus, if there is a change in the number of gun robberies in the month 
after the law’s introduction, it cannot be due to a change in incapacitation, and the change 
may be attributed to the deterrent effect of the increased sentence length. 
There are several characteristics of add-on gun laws that make them ideal for 
isolating the deterrent effect of incarceration.  First, they are generally only applied in 
cases where the underlying crime would merit a sentence of at least several years, which 
allows a reasonable period of time to detect the deterrent effect.  Second, add-on laws 
were adopted in many different states, yielding many separate experiments for the 
analysis.  This builds on previous studies of deterrence, which usually focus on a single 
state (see e.g. Loftin and McDowall, 1989; Kessler and Levitt, 1999).  Finally, add-on 
laws were adopted in at least four decades, during which there was substantial variation 
in crime rates.  The temporal and cross-sectional variation in adoption of add-on laws 
makes it possible to control for time trends and state fixed effects. 
Understanding the impact of incarceration has grown more important over time as 
incarceration rates in the United States have grown by over 250% between 1980 and 
2008.1  The total U.S. incarcerated population in 2008 stood at 2.4 million, with the U.S. 
having the highest incarceration rate worldwide (Walmsley, 2009).  These vastly 
                                                 
1 See the Bureau of Justice Statistics website for recent data on incarceration rates: 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
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increased numbers have led to recent interest in reexamining the efficacy of current 
policies. 
The relative impact of incapacitation and deterrence are of first-order importance 
in understanding how to effectively reduce crime.  If deterrence is very small, increasing 
sentence lengths would only reduce crime by taking potential offenders off the streets for 
longer periods of time.  This is a very expensive proposition, with jailing costs around 
$100/day (see e.g. DiIulio and Piehl, 1991; Waldfogel, 1993; Levitt, 1996).  
Alternatively, if deterrence is substantial, then increasing sentences offers a relatively low 
cost means of reducing the incidence of crime.  If tougher sentences make a potential 
criminal less likely to offend then the state reduces crime without bearing the cost of 
enforcing the penalties. This type of rationale may be found in much of the literature on 
the economics of crime, going back to Becker’s initial work in the 1960’s (Becker, 1968).  
The aim of this paper is to empirically estimate the magnitude of deterrence more 
accurately than has previously been possible. 
One of the implications of Becker’s model of crime is that the most cost-effective 
crime-fighting strategy is one with very large fines and low probabilities of detection.  
Risk-neutral potential criminals will be equally deterred as with lower fines and higher 
probability of detection, but the cost to society will be much lower.2  Of course this is 
only true if defendants can be made to pay the high fines.  This is one of the reasons that 
incarceration is in such common use - the penalty must be credible.  Similarly, if lengthy 
sentences (analogous to large fines) substantially decrease defendant likelihood of 
                                                 
2 Polinsky and Shavell (1999) show that if disutility of imprisonment is less than linear in time, increasing 
policing and decreasing lengths of incarceration may be optimal.  Their model would still imply a deterrent 
effect of increased incarceration, although smaller than if disutility of imprisonment is linear or greater than 
linear in time. 
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committing crime, they should be a cost-effective way to reduce crime, perhaps even in 
conjunction with a decrease in policing. 
A great deal of research has gone into empirically testing various aspects of 
economic models of crime.  A full review of the literature on deterrence has been the 
subject of a number of review articles, with mixed conclusions.  Nagin (1998) finds 
evidence for an overall deterrent effect in the criminal justice system, but believes more 
work is needed to better establish that increased sentences deter crime.  Doob and 
Webster (2003) review a large number of papers by criminologists and a handful by 
economists and conclude that the lack of strong evidence for deterrence is widespread 
enough to conclude that there is a null effect.  These coauthors along with Frank Zimring 
(Webster, Doob, Zimring 2006) take a skeptical view of Kessler and Levitt’s 1999 paper, 
and its evidence for deterrence.3  Robinson and Darley (2004) take a somewhat more 
nuanced view that there are circumstances where increased sentences may deter, although 
they believe the magnitude is insufficient to influence policy decisions.  Levitt and Miles 
(2007), in a wide-ranging piece, point to some of the economic studies that suggest there 
is evidence for deterrence, but conclude that more research on the topic is needed. 
Some of the earliest empirical work by an economist on deterrence was by Isaac 
Ehrlich (e.g. Ehrlich 1981) and focused to a great extent on murder.  Recent papers 
attempting to distinguish deterrence from incapacitation include Levitt (1998a) in which 
he infers the relative importance of incapacitation and deterrence (and finds support for 
the importance of both) by looking at the substitution between different crimes.  Helland 
and Tabarrok (2007) investigate the effects of California’s three strikes law and find a 
                                                 
3 Some of the criticism seems to originate from a misunderstanding of the triple difference strategy in 
Kessler and Levitt (1999).   
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decrease in arrests of around 20% among felons with two strikes.   Drago, Galbiati, and 
Vertova (2009) use a natural experiment in Italy that induced individual-level variation in 
sentencing to estimate a deterrence effect.  
Several papers have used the discontinuity in sentencing at the age of majority to 
identify deterrence effects.  Levitt (1998b) uses cross-state differences in the relative 
harshness of adult sanctions relative to those for juveniles.  He finds that those states with 
larger jumps in punishment tend to have larger decreases in adult crime relative to 
juvenile.  Hjalmarsson (2009) finds that offender perceptions of penalties change far less 
than actual changes at the age of majority, and finds little evidence of deterrence in self-
reported data.  Lee and McCrary (2009) use high frequency data from Florida to search 
for a discontinuity in offending around the 18th birthday.  They find a drop in crime of 
2% around this discontinuity and suggest that part of the low response might be due to 
myopic behavior.  Two other recent papers of note look not at sentence length, but rather 
prison conditions and find evidence for deterrence (Katz, Levitt, Shustorovich, 2003; 
Chen and Shapiro, 2007). 
A number of studies have looked at changes in gun laws in individual 
jurisdictions (e.g. Britt, Bordua and Kleck, 1996; Loftin and McDowall, 1984).  The 
mixed results found in those papers may be partially explained by heterogeneity in 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, discussed in Tonry (1992) and Kessler and Piehl 
(1998). 
This paper takes a similar methodological approach to Kessler and Levitt (1999) 
in which they make use of sentence enhancements in California enacted by the passage of 
Proposition 8 to estimate deterrence.  In that paper, as in this, the authors separate 
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deterrence from incapacitation by examining changes in short-term crime rates for 
serious offenses with lengthy underlying sentences.  Kessler and Levitt estimate the 
magnitude of the three year deterrent effect to be 8%. 
Another paper that this one parallels is that of Marvell and Moody (1995) in 
which they examine the effect of gun laws on a range of outcomes.  The authors assemble 
a data set on firearm sentencing enhancements and test their impacts using panel data on 
both prison populations and crime.  The authors find little evidence for impact of these 
laws on either category of outcome. 
Although making use of the same law changes, this paper differs substantially in 
methodology, outcomes of interest, and conclusions from Marvell and Moody.  Most 
significantly, Marvell and Moody are estimating a combined effect of both deterrence 
and incapacitation, whereas this paper focuses on isolating the deterrent effect.  Their 
regressor of interest is a dummy variable that is one any time after the adoption of an 
add-on gun law.  Making use of this regressor, along with an unbalanced panel gives 
substantially higher weight to states with early adoption of add-on laws.  One further 
methodological difference is that this paper uses difference in differences to estimate 
effects, whereas Marvell and Moody’s specification for gun robberies identifies the 
effects from time series variation alone.   
  The strategy in this paper for estimating the impact of increased sentence length 
follows similar lines to some of the aforementioned studies, but differs in important 
ways.  First, I use an event study methodology in order to make greater use of the 
temporal variations in the data.  Second, conclusions drawn from this research are easily 
generalized due to the length and breadth of the data set used.  The sample in this study is 
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extremely representative of the country as a whole, since most states passed an add-on 
gun law at some point in the period investigated.  It also uses a time series almost 40 
years long, which lends strength to the belief that the findings are not location and time 
specific.  Third, the primary type of crime examined, robberies, is of significant interest 
because of its relative prevalence and substantial negative impact.  This study makes use 
of hand-cleaned data to get around the well-known data errors in the Uniform Crime 
Reports.  Fourth, a great deal of the paper is spent testing alternate specifications in an 
attempt to fully explore the sensitivity of the findings to choices of specification.  
Carefully checking that estimations are robust is of particular importance in the crime 
literature where the data is often noisy, clear experiments are rare, and confounds are 
plentiful (Maltz and Targonski 2004).  Finally, I attempt to address difficulties that affect 
many studies with one-time rule changes in calculating correct standard errors (Bertrand, 
Duflo, Mullainathan 2004).  I do so by constructing placebo laws and estimate standard 
errors using a Monte Carlo simulation. 
I find evidence for a deterrent effect of sentence enhancement in the form of add-
on gun laws.  The preferred specification yields a statistically significant point estimate of 
a 5% reduction in gun robberies within 3 years of the add-ons.  I run numerous alternate 
specifications to address a host of potential confounds and gain a more thorough 
understanding of the impact of add-on gun laws.  These robustness checks include using 
alternate date specifications, separately testing the effect of mandatory minimum laws, 
using different functional forms, weighting and data aggregation, allowing for 
autocorrelation and trend breaks in the data, using triple differences, and calculating 
numerical standard errors from a Monte Carlo simulation using placebo laws.  The results 
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from these specifications support the central conclusion of a decrease in the gun robbery 
rate within the first three years of introduction of add-on gun laws. 
According to the economic model of crime, add-on gun laws should impact all 
crimes committed with the use of a gun.  Besides robbery, the other major crime for 
which data is widely available on firearm use is assault, which does not exhibit a 
significant response to add-on penalties.  This may support the notion that assaults are 
often “crimes of passion” and that individuals who commit assaults are not well-
described by the rational criminal model.  However the data on assaults is substantially 
noisier than for robberies which biases the estimates toward zero and may account for the 
lack of a statistically significant effect. 
A concern regarding the impact of sentence enhancements is of unintended 
spillover effects.  If add-ons simply cause a shift from gun crimes to non-gun crimes, 
only looking at gun crimes will overstate the effect.  I test for this possibility by 
examining outcomes for non-gun robberies, and find that there was a decrease there as 
well.  I further test for another plausible crime substitute, burglary, where there also 
appears to be a decline following add-on gun laws.  This suggests that rather than 
switching crimes in response to increased penalties, some potential criminals “go 
straight” instead. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides a brief background 
on firearm sentencing enhancements and a description of the data.  Section III presents 
the main specifications along with a discussion of potential interpretations and 
confounds.  Section IV presents the main empirical results.  In Section V a number of 
alternate specifications and robustness checks are discussed; Section VI concludes. 
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II. The History of Add-on Gun Laws and Data Description 
 
An add-on gun law, as used in this paper, is a state law which mandates enhanced 
prison sentences for defendants convicted of a felony who are further found to have used 
or been in possession of a firearm in the commission of the felony.  These types of laws 
became popular in the 1970s with the aim of reducing armed crimes.  Over 25 states 
currently have add-on gun laws in their statutes, with most states adopting the laws in the 
1970s and 80s. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the timing of add-on law 
adoption across states.   
This paper presents an investigation into changes in crime rates around the 
introduction of add-on gun laws.  There are two different dates that could be relevant in 
causing a response in crime rates and thus two different sources for the law changes.  The 
first uses data obtained from Vernick and Hepburn (2003) on the date the add-on law 
became effective.4  Use of this date is premised on fully-informed criminals rationally 
responding to changes in penalties precisely when they occur. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the publicity and debate surrounding an imminent change in the law or uncertainty 
about the law’s effective date had an impact on potential criminal behavior before the 
change actually occurred.  Thus several specifications explore changes in criminal 
activity at the time of the date of passage of the add-on gun law. These data were 
collected by the author from state criminal codes and state legislative journals and are 
summarized in Table 1.   
                                                 
4 This data is largely based on Marvell and Moody (1995) with a number of updates and corrections. 
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Add-on gun laws are a prominent example of legislative efforts to reduce the 
incidence of crime beginning in the 1960s.5  Legislation leading to increased penalties 
was introduced in an attempt to deter potential criminals and incapacitate potential 
recidivists.  Closely related to add-on gun laws, and also designed to curb crimes 
involving firearms, are mandatory minimum laws.  These laws are distinct from add-on 
laws because they do not necessarily increase the sentence length for a given defendant, 
but only provide a lower bound on his or her sentence length. Identifying the deterrent 
effect of increased incarceration time using changes in behavior around the time of the 
introduction of mandatory minimums poses a relatively complex problem since in many 
cases the minimum does not bind.6  That is, in many states, the minimum sentence for 
armed robbery is longer than the mandatory minimum for gun crimes.  Nevertheless, the 
introduction of mandatory minimum laws provides a good proxy for any state-specific 
unobserved characteristics which may be associated with both changes in the incidence of 
crime and the decision to introduce gun add-ons.  For this reason, the introduction of 
mandatory minimums is included in the empirical specifications and permits improved 
identification of the deterrent effect of the add-on laws.  
The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), compiled by the FBI, contains the longest 
and broadest dataset on crime in the United States.7  The latest reports consist of data 
                                                 
5 Around the same time, sentencing guidelines were introduced around the country. Their purpose was to 
standardize sentence lengths but they also led to more severe sentencing in many cases. 
6 I run specifications using mandatory minimum gun laws alone to check for a significant effect, but do not 
find evidence for one.  The coefficients on the mandatory minimum dummy variables are provided in Table 
2.  
 
7 Another substantial dataset frequently used to study the impact of criminal legislation is the National 
Crime Victimization Survey.  This data set has some advantages over the UCR in that it may capture 
crimes that go unreported to the police.  However the data does not include geographic identification and 
thus cannot be used in the current research.  “State codes are not available in the National Sample because 
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collected from nearly 17,000 law reporting agencies, a number that has increased 
substantially over time.  The increase in reporting agencies within each state poses an 
empirical challenge.  Including all agencies reporting in a given time period will lead to a 
substantially unbalanced panel: later dates would receive much more weight.  Thus for 
the main specifications, I construct a set of the 500 most populous agencies that report 
data for the full sample range (1965 – 2002).  Twenty-one agencies are added to this data 
set for a total of 521 to ensure that every state is represented by at least 3 agencies.8 
The uniform crime reports are known to contain substantial numbers of data 
errors, particularly at the agency level (Maltz and Targonski, 2004).  Part of the data 
cleaning process required examination and correction of the data by hand, which 
necessitated limiting the data to the most populous agencies as described above.  The data 
set used covers approximately 40% of the contemporary US population.  I also use an 
alternate specification where data is aggregated to the state level.  This has the advantage 
of being somewhat less noisy, but the difficulty that the number of agencies encompassed 
by a state varies over time. 
There are several different types of data within the UCR including reported 
offenses, unfounded offenses, offenses cleared (cases in which arrests are made), and 
juvenile offenses cleared.  In this study, I use reported offenses rather than arrests as the 
primary measure of the incidence of crime.  This choice is made to try to address the 
concern that policing might be modified to focus on gun crimes in response to or 
contemporaneous with the introduction of add-on gun laws.  A modification in policing 
                                                                                                                                                 
of confidentiality restrictions” (BJS 1998).  City level files are available for 26 major cities for the years 
1972-1975.  These were not used due to the short time span available. 
8 There is one exception to this rule.  There were only two districts in Vermont that reported for the full 
time period. 
 
 12
behavior in response to legislative changes would be reflected in the number of offenses 
cleared and complicates the task of isolating the responsiveness of criminal activity to the 
new law.  There may also be a change in crime reporting behavior in response to a law 
change or the ensuing publicity.  To address this concern, this paper makes use of 
reported crimes rather than arrests.  This way, even if there are contemporaneous policing 
changes, the impact on reported crimes should presumably be less sensitive to law 
changes than policies.   
Within each category of offenses there are counts by reporting agency and by type 
of offense.  Important to this study is the fact that, since 1965, counts of robberies and 
assaults have been distinguished by type of weapon involved.  Reported gun robberies are 
the primary focus of this study due to data availability and the presumption that they are 
more likely to be “economic crimes” than assaults.9 
 
III. Methodology 
 
 The empirical challenge is to isolate the effect of add-on gun laws, estimate their 
impacts, and try to minimize the possibility that estimates result from something other 
than deterrent effects of the laws.  With this in mind I adopt an event study methodology 
for most specifications, which takes advantage of the variation in adoption date and 
                                                 
9 Definitions from the Uniform Crime Reports: 
Robbery - The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person 
or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or putting the victim in fear.  Separate counts are 
included for Firearm Robbery (i.e., any firearm is used as a weapon or employed as a means of force to 
threaten the victim or put him in fear). 
Assault - An unlawful attack by one person upon another.  Firearm Assault includes all assaults wherein a 
firearm of any type (e.g., revolver, automatic pistol, shotgun, zip gun, rifle, etc.) is used or its use is 
threatened. 
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magnitude of add-on gun laws across states.  I perform various falsification checks, 
including testing the date of law adoption versus the effective date, using placebo 
implementation dates, adding further controls, and restricting the data set.  I test several 
models allowing for variation in the immediacy of impact of the law.  I test several 
different outcomes: gun robberies, gun assault, non-gun robberies, and burglaries.  I 
control for lagged prison population data, police population share, economic variables, 
and demographic variables. 
 The goal here is to identify the deterrent effect of incarceration, separate from 
incapacitation.  Thus it is necessary to distinguish between changes in crime rates 
following the introduction of add-on laws caused by increased spells of incarceration 
from crime rate changes due to the fact that some potential offenders may have been 
deterred.  This is done by restricting attention to crime rates within a short period 
immediately following the introduction of the add-on law. 
 The logic is as follows: Assume the minimum sentence for the underlying crime 
prior to the add-on was x years and the add-on increases it by y additional years.  Within 
the first x years after the law change there will be no effective change to incapacitation: 
all offenders sentenced in this period after the law change would have been incapacitated 
under the old law as well.  Thus any change in crime rates in the first x years cannot be 
due to incapacitation, and may be interpreted as a deterrent effect. 
An important question, therefore, is of the appropriate value of x, the previous 
minimum sentence for the underlying crime.  An estimate of three years was found as 
follows: Data on the minimum and maximum sentence for 1st degree robbery (or its 
equivalent) was collected from state statutes for 47 of the 50 states (Figure 2).  The mean 
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minimum sentence length is 5.5 years and the median 5 years.  For the maximum the 
numbers are 16.5 and 13.5 years, respectively.  It is possible that some defendants serve 
less than the minimum time, receiving time off for good behavior (although truth-in-
sentencing laws have reduced the likelihood of this happening over time).  Ideally, one 
would prefer an empirical distribution of time served by state, but no such data set exists 
for the required years.  The best empirical data on actual time served comes from the 
National Corrections Reporting Program, which is consistent with the three year figure.  
A three-year time span was hence chosen as a conservative estimate of the time during 
which those prisoners prevented from reoffending by incarceration would have been 
removed from the set of potential offenders independent of the introduction of an add-on 
gun law.10   
The key identifying assumption in this paper is that add-on gun law adoptions are 
exogenous.  Although most add-on gun laws were enacted in the 1970s, due to the 
previously-discussed national trends, the particular timing in a state is to a large degree 
random due to the vagaries of the political process within each state.  This assumption 
plays a critical role in allowing the empirical tests to distinguish between general trends 
in crime rates in a given state and changes in behavior that are attributable to the 
introduction of the add-on law.   
In order to further investigate the plausibility of this assumption, I collected 
additional data from newspapers.  While it is difficult to establish complete randomness 
in the timing of law changes, there is some evidence to this point.  Often legislative 
activity on crime-related issues is spurred by idiosyncratic events, like a particularly 
notorious crime.  Newspaper data was collected in order to investigate whether this was a 
                                                 
10 To be even more conservative, most of the analysis is also performed for one and two year time spans.   
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frequent impetus for add-on gun laws.  There is scant digitally searchable newspaper data 
available before the 1990’s, yielding only 6 newspapers from 4 states with articles within 
a year of the law change.  Although the small sample size makes it difficult to draw 
strong conclusions, it is informative to note that articles in 2 of the 4 states point to 
specific, notorious crimes as spurring the introduction of legislation. 11   
 
A. Central Specification 
 The initial test for the impact of add-on gun laws is a simple difference in 
difference, 
atst
mm
st
x
tsst
Addon
at
y    (1) 
Here yat is the outcome of interest, namely a per capita crime rate, or log per 
capita crime rate.  The variable Addonst is a dummy that is one in states with an add-on 
gun law in force, within n years of the add-on date (where n varies across different 
specifications), and zero otherwise.12  λs allows for permanent differences across states in 
crime rates (state fixed effects).  Any national trends in crime will be absorbed into the 
year dummies (γt).  Potentially important time varying state characteristics are controlled 
for with the vector xst. Controls include poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned 
                                                 
11 While it is difficult to establish complete randomness in the timing of law changes, there is some 
evidence to this point.  Often legislative activity on crime-related issues is spurred by idiosyncratic events, 
like a particularly notorious crime.  Newspaper data was collected in order to investigate whether this was a 
frequent impetus for add-on gun laws.  There is scant digitally searchable newspaper data available before 
the 1990’s, yielding only 6 newspapers from 4 states with articles within a year of the law change.  
Although the small sample size makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions, it is informative to note that 
articles in 2 of the 4 states point to specific, notorious crimes as spurring the introduction of legislation. 
12 Since there are only two examples of repeals of add-on gun laws (California in 1977 and Tennessee in 
1989) there will be tremendous autocorrelation in this variable.  This makes standard errors prone to 
potential underestimation, as discussed in Bertrand, et al (2004).  Both clustering standard errors by state 
and estimating standard errors using placebo laws are used to correct this problem. 
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population.13  They also include a dummy for whether the state has a mandatory 
minimum law in force (mmst).  The coefficient β signifies the impact of the add-on gun 
law.  Errors (εat) are allowed to be heteroskedastic and correlated within states.  Thus 
robust standard errors are clustered at the state level and population-weighted. 
One potential shortcoming of the specification in (1) is that it doesn’t allow for 
state-specific trends in crime that could impact a state’s likelihood of adoption of an add-
on gun law.  Adding these trends reduces the burden of exogeneity of the add-on laws: 
now the timing must simply be exogenous once state-specific crime trends are accounted 
for.  The following specification adds the state-time trends (ωst):  
atst
mm
st
xt
stsst
Addon
at
y    (2) 
This specification is also estimated using robust, population-weighted errors. 
 
B. Event Study  
 To obtain a more precise understanding of the impact the add-on gun laws have 
year-by-year after their effective dates, it is useful to group agencies together according 
to the time period relative to the add-on date in their state.  This results in an event study 
methodology similar to that employed by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) in 
order to identify earnings losses of displaced workers: 
atst
xt
sts
D
at
y ist
ni
i   

 (3) 
The outcome as before is a measure of the crime rate at the agency level, and λs, γt, ωst, 
xst, and εat are as described above.  The major distinction is that now there are multiple 
variables of interest, the βi which indicate the impact of the add-on gun law at various 
                                                 
13 Data for control variables were kindly made available by John Donohue. 
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different times relative to the law’s effective date.  The Dst
i are dummy variables that are 
1 in state s if period t is exactly i periods after the effective date in that state, and zero 
otherwise.  For example, in Arkansas the add-on year is 1981, so the i=3 dummy will be 
1 in 1984.  The relative time index, i, may take on negative values to allow for any 
potential effects prior to the add-on date.  This methodology is powerful in that it conveys 
a lot of information about the dynamics of the response to the add-on gun laws. 
 
C. Triple Difference 
The magnitude of the add-on sentence is another source of variation that can be 
exploited to further assess the deterrent effect of these laws.  I interact the magnitude of 
the add-on with the timing dummies in a triple difference specification: 
stst
mm
st
x
tss
Term
st
Addon
s
Term
st
Addon
at
y   *  (4) 
One would expect a greater deterrent effect in jurisdictions with greater add-on penalties.  
I test for this by estimating the coefficient on the interaction of the sentence term and 
add-on timing dummy. 
 
D. Lagged Dependant Variables 
Thus far all models presented have made the assumption that crime is determined 
by contemporaneous variables, or lags of regional characteristics, such as prison 
population.  It certainly seems plausible, however, that current levels of crime could be 
impacted by previous levels of crime.  For example, a high level of crime in period t-1 
could lead to a change in police vigilance, a quantity that is not readily quantifiable.  This 
in turn could lead to a decrease in crime in period t.  Another story which also leads to 
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this sort of structure would be one where previous levels of crime are informative to 
prospective criminals in a way that is not fully accounted for in the control variables.  
Higher levels of crime in period t-1 could indicate greater likelihood of success, and thus 
a higher level of crime in period t.  We can express this model with a lagged dependant 
variable as follows: 
sttsst
mm
st
x
st
Addon
st
y
st
y   1    (5) 
The addition of the lagged dependant variable complicates the estimation 
procedure, relative to the models previously discussed.  In particular, the fixed effect 
estimator thus far employed will be biased in the presence of a lagged dependant 
variable.  This intuitively must be so since by the definition of a fixed effect, the lagged 
endogenous variable would be correlated with the error term.  Given this difficulty, we 
follow the estimation procedure outlined in Arellano and Bond (1991). 
First we may reinterpret all variables as deviations from the period means.  This 
eliminates γt.  Next, take the first difference of equation (5) (first aggregating all variables 
in state s at time t into Dst): 
)
1
()
1
()
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(
1  stststDstDstystystysty   (6) 
Ordinary least squares estimation will be inconsistent since the lagged dependant variable 
will be correlated with the error term through common period t-1 terms.  Thus an 
instrumental variables approach is necessary to produce consistent estimates.  Arellano 
and Bond propose using lagged values of the dependant variable and the other regressors 
as the instruments for the first differences.  Their use requires the identifying assumption 
that a kth lag may be used as an instrument only if there is no kth order serial correlation.  
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As in Arellano and Bond (1991), I make use of the GMM procedure to optimally take 
advantage of this identifying assumption.14 
Since the validity of the GMM procedure crucially hinges on the identifying 
assumptions, they must be tested.  An Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in panel 
data is used to test the assumption of serial correlation for different orders.  Further, a test 
of overidentifying restrictions that is robust to heteroskedasticity is also performed.   
 
E. Change in Slope 
Thus far most of the specifications have focused on the coefficient on addonst, i.e.  
the difference in means before and after add-on gun laws.  This choice has been made 
because a shift in mean crime rate is what the economic theory of crime predicts as the 
response to an increase in sanctions.  However, one could certainly incorporate non-
instantaneous information transmission which would lead to both a change in mean of 
crime rates and a change in time trends relative to a change in sanctions, represented by 
Equation 7. 
atst
mm
st
xt
sts
relyr
st
Addon
st
Addon
at
y   *         (7) 
In fact, it is possible that the response to this policy change will not be 
instantaneous, and a more accurate representation would include a higher order terms of 
relative time to allow for adjustment to the new regime.  To estimate this type of model 
one would simply need to modify Equation 7 by adding a polynomial in time relative to 
the add-on gun law effective date. 
 
                                                 
14 There is one further assumption that is made, namely the standard assumption about the exogeneity of the 
other control variables being used for instruments. 
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IV. Empirical Findings 
 
A. Main Results 
The first empirical results are from a regression of reported log gun robberies per 
capita on post add-on dummies, using the specification in Equation (1).  Table 2 presents 
the results, with each column representing a separate regression.  The log specification is 
preferred because it counts equivalent relative declines in per capita gun robberies 
equally.  “Balanced panel” indicates that data points were included only if they were 
within 7 years prior to, or 6 years after the effective date for an add-on law.  This is the 
maximum range of data that is available for all states that passed add-on laws.  In half of 
the specifications the data is restricted to years after 1974 due to the fact that there is a 
discontinuity in several variables in a large number of agencies in 1975 in the UCR 
data.15  Panels A, B, and C differ in the number of years included in coding the post add-
on dummy.  For example, in panel B, the add-on law dummy is one for the first two years 
following the add-on law effective date and zero otherwise.    All errors reported allow 
for intra-state correlation and are weighted by state population.  All specifications 
included state and year effects, and the controls discussed in section III. 
Log per capita crime rate is the preferred dependant variable in this paper and this 
preference may be illustrated by the following example.  Assume Miami has a pre-gun 
law level of 200 gun robberies per 100,000 residents and Phoenix has a pre-gun law level 
of 100 gun robberies per 100,000 residents.  We might believe that the severity of the 
impact of a marginal crime decreases with level of crime, so a reduction from 100 to 50 
                                                 
15 Staff members at the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, which houses the publicly available 
UCR data set, were unable to account for this break in the data. 
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gun robberies per 100,000 residents is more meaningful than one from 200 to 150 per 
100,000 residents.  If this belief about social preferences is accurate, it is appropriate to 
focus on the logarithm of the per capita rate of gun robberies as the outcome of interest.  I 
also run regressions using per capita crime data as the dependant variable.  These results 
are reported in part C of Section V. 
Across specifications there appears to be a consistent finding that gun robbery 
rates decline after add-on gun laws go into effect.  The impact is insignificant in the first 
year, but is significant at the 1% level after two or three years.  The coefficients in Table 
2 yield an estimate of the magnitude of the impact of the impact.  Although the 
coefficients vary somewhat across specifications, there is a decline of 6-14% within the 
first two years and 5-18% within the first three years of introduction of the law.  In the 
preferred specification, which is the most conservative, with a balanced-panel restricted 
to post-1974 data and including state-specific time trends, there is an impact which seems 
to level off to 6% within two years, and 5% within three years.  Note that the addition of 
state-specific time trends does not affect the coefficient substantially.  This provides 
some support for the notion that the timing of add-on gun laws is exogenous.16 
In order to gain more information on the timing of the impact of the law change, I 
estimate equation (3) using log per-capita gun robberies as the dependant variable.  The 
results, reported in Table 3 and Figure 317, support the findings discussed above.  Gun 
robberies rates (both with and without controlling for state trends) are fairly stable in the 
years preceding implementation of an add-on gun law, then decline for approximately 
                                                 
16 Wolfers (2006) notes that adding state-specific time trends in Friedberg (1998) causes a large change in 
coefficients and casts some doubt on the assumption that at-will divorce law passage was exogenous.  
17 The absolute values on the y-axis of this and other figures are not meaningful in themselves (since they 
come from regressions that include a number of regressors with non-zero means) but the changes are. 
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three years and then level out.  One surprising feature of Figure 3 is that it appears that 
the downward trend may begin slightly before the effective date.  I discuss the timing of 
the impact of the law in part A of Section V. 
The evidence from UCR data on gun robberies supports the notion that criminals 
are deterred by the implementation of add-on gun laws.  There are a number of important 
confounds that could be belie this interpretation, and they are addressed at length in 
Section V.  But it is important to take note of the strength of the evidence presented here.  
By using panel data with state and time fixed effects, I have attempted to rule out that 
spurious results could be obtained due to an overall national time trend in crime, or cross-
sectional endogeneity in passage of add-on gun laws.  Adding state trends increases the 
strength of the exogeneity assumption by ruling out endogenous response in law passage 
not just to levels, but also to state trends in crime.  Making use of timing dummies 
relative to the law effective date allows for the detection of the dynamic response of 
crime relative to implementation of the law.   
 
B. Gun Assaults and Total Assaults 
If the economic model of crime is correct, one should observe a deterrent effect of 
add-on gun laws on all types of gun crimes.  The other category of crime for which 
weapon type is reported in the UCR is assault.  Assaults are often considered to be 
“crimes of passion” and thus may not be as well described by the economic model of 
crime.  Nevertheless, one might expect that some fraction of assaults do have an indirect 
economic motive, or at least respond to changes in penalties. 
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Using UCR data on reported gun assaults, I test for a deterrent effect of add-on 
gun laws on gun assaults, and find no significant effect.  Table 4 reports results from 
specifications described by equations (1) and (2) and Figure 4 displays coefficients from 
the specification in equation (3).  It is difficult to discern much of a pattern around the 
add-on law effective date from the figure.  However, Table 4 tells a somewhat different 
and intriguing story.  Add-on laws do not appear to have a significant effect on gun 
assaults within one, two or three years of the effective date.  Still, almost all of the 
coefficients on gun assaults are negative, suggesting weak deterrence on gun assaults.  
Assault data in the UCR has substantially greater intertemporal and cross-sectional 
variation than robbery data, and the null result may simply be due to inability to extract a 
signal from the noise.  The evidence suggests that assaults may be weakly deterred by 
increased penalties, but the findings are not statistically significant. 
 
C. Non-gun Robberies and Burglaries 
While economic theory clearly predicts a negative relationship between the 
presence of add-on gun laws and gun crimes, the prediction is less clear for non-gun 
crimes.  Add-on gun laws will increase non-gun crimes if guns and other weapons are 
good substitutes and criminals shift towards other weapons or types of crime as the cost 
of using a gun increases.  Alternatively, add-on gun laws may reduce non-gun crimes if 
individuals choose whether or not to be a generalist career criminal based on the total 
expected returns of criminal and alternative careers.  Decreased expected returns due to 
add-on gun laws could lead criminals to shift into the legitimate sector and thus reduce 
levels of all types of crime. 
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Data from both non-gun robberies and burglaries appear to support the career 
criminal model over the substitution model.  First I investigate the effect of add-on gun 
laws on total robberies and robberies using weapons other than guns, with results 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 5.  There is no evidence in any of the regressions 
for the substitution model, as almost all estimates for the short-term impact of add-on gun 
laws on non-gun robberies and total robberies are negative.  Not surprisingly, the effect 
of non-gun robberies is not as substantial (or significant) as that on gun robberies, with 
the preferred specification yielding a three year impact of -3%.  This is the same point 
estimate obtained for total robberies, although most specifications yield estimates with 
slightly higher magnitudes for total robberies.  Turning to the relative year dummy 
specification reveals a similar temporal pattern, but of smaller magnitude, for both non-
gun robberies (Figure 5) and total robberies (not reported) as for gun robberies. 
It appears that criminals do not substitute other weapons for guns in order to 
commit robberies, but perhaps they substitute different crimes for robbery when the price 
of using a gun increases.  Burglary is the closest substitute for robbery in the Uniform 
Crime Reports.  Table 7 reports a statistically significant 5% decline in burglaries per 
capita in the three years following introduction of an add-on gun law (in the preferred 
specification).  Turning to the event study methodology (Figure 6) provides evidence of a 
similar temporal pattern relative to the add-on date for burglaries, as for gun robberies 
and non-gun robberies.   
It appears that a number of different types of crime are being impacted by the 
implementation of add-on gun laws.  As discussed above, these results support the career 
criminal hypothesis.  There are also other potential explanations for the similar time 
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pattern of crime reduction.  For example, misclassification of some fraction of gun 
robberies as non-gun robberies could lead to these results.  Other possibilities could 
include a contemporaneous law enforcement change (like a broad crackdown on crime) 
or a mean-reverting crime process with endogenous legislative implementation of add-on 
gun laws.  These potential confounds and a number of specification checks are discussed 
in Section V.  
 
V. Addressing Potential Concerns 
 
A. Timing of the Decline in Crime 
Thus far I have presented evidence for a deterrent effect of add-on gun laws, 
leading to a decrease in gun robberies per capita of about 5% within the first 3 years of 
passage.  One potential concern regards the timing of the decrease in crime: there is a 
slight (statistically insignificant) decline in gun robberies prior to the effective date of the 
add-on law, even when controlling for state-specific time trends (Figure 3).  Although the 
regression results indicate a significant decrease in crime after the effective date of the 
law change, there may be concern that states pass laws in response to a run-up in crime, 
and the decline is simply reflecting mean reversion in crime rates.  The fact that a decline 
in crime prior to the effective date of the law persists even when state trends are included 
casts some doubt on this explanation.  This still leaves open the possibility that laws are 
passed in response to changes in the crime trend.  Anecdotal data from newspaper articles 
presented provides some evidence that the exact date of law change is largely 
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stochastic.18  In order to further address this concern, specifications using higher order 
polynomials for state time trends were tested with results similar to those presented (see 
discussion below and Table 8). 
Another possible interpretation of the slight decrease in crime pre-law change is 
that potential offenders learn about the law through ongoing public debate and discussion 
and modify their behavior in anticipation of the law change.  The process by which 
potential offenders learn about criminal sanctions is not well-studied.  There is some 
evidence (Pogarsky, et al. 2004; Tunnell 1996) that potential criminals often have very 
noisy information about penalties they may face.  Other work (Cook 1980) suggests that 
potential criminals may learn of law changes through the media and will change behavior 
even with imperfect knowledge of new sanctions.  Discussions of the author’s with 
criminal defendants and public defenders indicate that at least some defendants are aware 
of sanctions.19   
Imperfect knowledge of law changes may lead to a weakened overall deterrent 
effect, and also to a modification of the timing in the response to penalty changes.  All 
specifications presented thus far have used the law’s effective date as the key 
independent variable.  But this date is often months or even years after the law has been 
debated in the legislature.  New laws are likely to receive the most publicity and have the 
                                                 
18 In order to gain a better understanding of when potential offenders are likely to have learned of add-on 
gun laws, I collected data from local newspapers about gun legislation.  This turns out to be a difficult task.  
For each of the 30 states that ever passed add-on gun laws, I searched for newspaper article availability for 
the largest newspaper in the state capital and in the largest city.  Although most newspapers have archives 
going back to the 1990’s, because many of the add-on laws were passed earlier, data was only available 
from six newspapers, representing four states, around the time of the add-ons.  For these newspapers, 
searches were run with various permutations of the terms firearm, gun, add-on, mandatory minimum, law, 
legislation, in order to determine which period had the greatest news coverage of the law change.  There 
was weak evidence of more publicity around the date of passage, but insufficient power to find statistical 
significance. 
19 An example of a media source that provides information on gun laws is Don Diva, a hip-hop magazine 
that has run articles entitled “What are Mandatory Minimums?” and “What Every Gangster Needs to 
Know.” 
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greatest effect on behavior around the date of legislative introduction or passage (see 
footnote 18).  To test this hypothesis, I collected the dates of legislative bill introduction 
or passage (the former are difficult to obtain for a number of states, but the latter may be 
found in state codes or legislative histories) and report these in Table 1. 
I replicate the regressions above using the date of bill passage instead of 
implementation and find a somewhat shifted time structure of the crime response, relative 
to the previous specifications (Figure 7).  The greatest declines in gun robbery rates occur 
in the first two years following the date of passage of the law, before leveling out.  The 
point estimates using date of passage are very similar to those reported above using the 
effective date of the law change.  This supports the hypothesis above regarding the timing 
of criminal response corresponding more closely to the date of passage.   
Although the law change is not yet effective, there are two mechanisms that could 
account for an immediate reduction in crime.  First, a forward-looking fully rational 
criminal may wish to change “careers” immediately, since the expected net benefits of 
crime have been reduced.  Second, the information a potential criminal receives about the 
law change may be imperfect.  For example, the potential offender may hear about a law 
change when it is publicized through the media, and may assume that it is effective 
immediately.  I do not attempt to distinguish these explanations here, and continue to use 
the timing of the base specification for all other regressions. 
 
B. Impact of Mandatory Minimum Laws 
 One of the most significant potential confounds of the deterrence interpretation is 
the possibility of other policy changes contemporaneous with add-on gun laws.  The most 
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likely candidate for such a contemporaneous change is a mandatory minimum law.  Many 
of the states that adopted add-on gun laws also adopted another type of law aimed at 
reducing gun violence, mandatory minimums.  These laws provide for a lower bound on 
sentences for crimes involving the use of a firearm.  As discussed previously, since 
mandatory minimums are often not binding, it makes a deterrence interpretation 
problematic. 
I test for an impact of mandatory minimum laws using the same methodology as 
used for add-on gun laws.  Table 2 presents coefficients on mandatory minimum law 
dummies in regressions including add-on law dummies as well.  None of the coefficients 
on the mandatory minimum dummies are significant.  The same results were found when 
running specifications including only mandatory minimum dummies, without those for 
add-on laws.  In Figure 8 I report coefficients from the event study specification, relative 
to the effective date of mandatory minimum laws.  While there appears to be a downward 
trend in per capita gun robberies following introduction of mandatory minimum laws 
(especially in the specification including state trends) the magnitude is small relative to 
the standard errors, and the impact is statistically insignificant.  Mandatory minimums 
appear to have at best a weak effect on gun robberies, thus ruling out this policy change 
as the driver of the main results. 
 
C. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the finding of a deterrent effect of add-on gun laws, a 
number of other specifications were tested.  I discuss potential confounds and how they 
were addressed. 
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1. Linear Specification 
In all specifications presented thus far, the log crime rate has been used as the 
outcome.  The choice of log was discussed in part A of Section IV, but there may be 
reasons why the simple crime rate would be the preferred outcome.  If for example, one 
preferred the assumption that equal changes in crime rates should be treated equally, 
regardless of initial level of crime, then crime rate is the preferred measure.  Figure 9 
presents coefficients from the event study methodology where the outcome is per capita 
gun robberies.  The pattern is very similar to that found using log per capita gun robberies 
as the outcome.   
Table 8 presents coefficients from a number of robustness checks.  The basic 
specification in the table is to report the effect of add-on gun laws on log gun robberies 
per capita within the first 3 years of the effective date.    In the first row of Table 8, the 
coefficients from the linear specification are presented (and thus the outcome is gun 
robberies per capita).  While a number of the coefficients are insignificant at the 5% 
level, most are significant at the 10%, and they are all negative and of a magnitude that is 
consistent with the coefficients found using log crime rates. 
 
2. Restricted comparison group: only states ever passing add-on laws 
Another potential concern is that the comparison group for the basic specification 
uses all states, regardless of whether they ever passed an add-on gun law.  If there is a 
secular difference in the time series between states adopting add-on laws and those not 
adopting them (not already captured by controls) this could impact the results.  In 
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regressions restricted to those states that ever pass an add-on gun law (Table 8, row 2), I 
find very similar coefficients to those presented in Table 2. 
 
3. State Level Data 
Since the laws of interest in this study are at the state level, it is useful to compare 
the results to those obtained using aggregate state-level data sets.  State-level data has the 
advantage of being substantially less noisy than agency data, and incorporates a 
considerably larger fraction of the U.S. population.  However, as noted before, it has the 
disadvantage of representing a widely varying population.  I find that the impact of add-
on gun laws on gun robbery rates using state level data is similar to that found using 
agency level data (Table 8, row 3).   
 
4. Population and Weighting 
Population data provided in the UCR was used both to calculate crime rates and to 
weight data appropriately, and thus all reported results are sensitive to population data.  
Several specification checks were performed to ensure that the results are not due to 
spurious population numbers.  They include running the regressions unweighted by 
population (Table 8, row 4), using number of incidents as the dependant variable (rather 
than per capita- reported in Table 8, row 5), and not allowing agency populations to vary 
over time (Table 8, row 6).  All of the specification checks yielded a negative impact of 
the add-on gun laws on gun robberies, although the first two were statistically 
insignificant. 
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  5. Higher order time trends 
State legislatures may respond not simply to trends in crime, but to an 
acceleration in crime rates increases, or to short term spikes that are not easily captured 
using linear trends.  Not including higher order time trends in the regressions allows for 
the possibility that some of the nonlinearity observable in the pre-add-on periods in 
Figure 3 is due to this phenomenon.  I addressed this concern by adding a cubic function 
of time to the basic regressions (Table 8, row 7), with the central findings unchanged.   
 
D. Triple Differences 
If sentences of larger magnitude have a greater deterrent effect, one would expect 
to see a larger drop in gun robberies in those states with a larger add-on prison term.  This 
dimension, add-on sentence term, can be interacted with the previous difference in 
difference to yield the triple difference specification presented in Equation (4).  The 
addition of a third dimension can be used to address the confound of contemporaneous 
policy changes as long as one does not expect a correlation between add-on magnitude 
and contemporaneous policy changes. 
One empirical difficulty with estimating the triple difference is that data on the 
add-on sentence term is quite noisy.  A number of states have fairly large ranges for their 
add-on sentence lengths, and thus the coding of this variable is difficult.20  Perhaps due to 
this fact, the results from the triple difference regressions (Table 9) are largely 
                                                 
20 When states have a range of add-on sentence length I used the minimum add-on term. 
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insignificant.  While insignificant, the coefficients are almost all negative providing weak 
evidence against the contemporaneous policy change possibility. 
 
E. Lagged Dependant Variables 
As discussed in Section III, part D, crime rates may be a function of their lagged 
values and thus should be modeled using a lagged dependant variable specification, as in 
Equation (5).  In order to address the violations of OLS assumptions inherent in 
estimating a model of this kind, I make use of the instrumental variables method 
described in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  I use all lags of at 
least two years in per capita guns robberies, along with differences of the control 
variables to instrument for the lagged dependant variable, with the results shown in Table 
10.21  I also report tests of the identifying assumptions of the instrumental variables 
strategy. 
The Arrelano-Bond test for autocorrelation in panel data shows strong evidence 
for rejecting the assumption of no first order autocorrelation (p<.002), but cannot reject 
the assumption of no higher order autocorrelation (2nd through 5th order autocorrelation 
was tested).  The Hansen J statistic was calculated for the overidentifying restrictions, 
and could not reject the hypothesis that the instruments were jointly exogenous.  The 
specification yields an insignificant estimate that there was a 6% drop in the rate of gun 
robberies within three years of the add-on gun law effective date, using the preferred 
specification.  Thus it appears that any bias caused by omission of the lagged crime rate 
is not substantial, and this finding bolsters the main results.   
 
                                                 
21 In order to use the techniques outlined in the above papers, I aggregated data to the state level.   
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F. Trend Breaks 
 As discussed in part E of Section III, a fuller behavioral model of crime might 
predict a response in crime rates that would not fully be captured by a mean shift in crime 
rates.  Even a rational model where learning is not instantaneous would lead to a change 
in the crime trend (as seen in the empirical data) rather than a step function.  In order to 
address this possibility, I estimate equation (7), which adds a break in crime time trend 
relative to the add-on law effective date.  I do not find evidence for a significant shift in 
slope using this specification (Table 8, row 8).  This is likely due to the fact that the mean 
shift captures most of the pre-post add-on shift in crime.  However, the addition of higher 
order terms of relative time, motivated by a more detailed theory of dissemination of 
information on sanctions to potential criminals could be a better fit to the data. 
  
G. Placebo Laws 
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that standard errors in difference-in-difference 
regressions are often misestimated.  This problem is particularly apparent in studies like 
the present one where the independent variable of interest is a dummy for a one-time law 
change, and therefore has substantial autocorrelation.  I address this potential difficulty 
by adopting both of the remedies suggested in the paper: clustering standard errors, and 
using placebo laws22 to generate standard errors.   
All errors reported in the tables are clustered by state; in Table 11, I report 
standard errors generated by a Monte Carlo simulation.  For each iteration of the 
simulation, a set of placebo laws was generated, by choosing with replacement from the 
                                                 
22 Helland and Tabarrok (2004) provide an excellent example of the importance of using placebo laws.  
They show that some of the most significant results found by Lott and Mustard in their 1997 paper become 
insignificant when using standard errors generated by placebo laws. 
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effective dates for the actual add-on laws.  A new effective date (or none) is assigned to 
each state.  A series of regressions are run using the placebo laws, and the point estimates 
recorded.  The simulation is iterated 500 times, and the resulting standard errors reported 
in square brackets in Table 11. 
The specification in this table is slightly different from those discussed previously 
in two ways.  The data used is at the state-month level and the window of time used is 
symmetric around the add-on law effective date.  For example, the two year impact uses 
data from two years prior to until two years after the add-on effective date. 
The results here are consistent with those found previously using agency-level 
data.  There seems to be a substantial deterrent effect of the add-on laws, which increases 
over the first three years.  The coefficients in these regressions are not directly 
comparable to those from the annual ones, although they do seem to indicate a somewhat 
larger magnitude of impact of the add-on laws. 
Importantly, the coefficients are still significant in a number of the specifications 
even when using the confidence intervals generated using the placebo laws.  The standard 
errors generated by the simulation are larger than those resulting from asymptotic 
assumptions, although the clustering already makes a substantial correction to the 
standard errors.  The placebo laws provide a strong test of the validity of the preceding 
analysis, which appears robust. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
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The question of how to best reduce crime is one of perennial importance, made 
even more salient during periods of budgetary strain.  Incarceration is currently by far the 
most favored method to reduce crime in the United States, and it acts primarily through 
two channels, incapacitation and deterrence.  Disentangling the relative contributions of 
the two channels is of primary importance in establishing sensible sentencing policies. 
In this paper, I use the introduction of add-on gun laws to isolate the deterrent 
effect of incarceration.  Since defendants sentenced under add-on gun laws receive 
sentences of several years for their underlying crime, any impact on crime within the first 
several years of an add-on gun law may be interpreted as due solely to its deterrent effect. 
I find that this effect on gun robberies is significant, with a per-capita reduction of 
5% within three years of the law’s effective date.  This reduction in gun robberies does 
not seem to come at substantial expense from criminals substituting to other types of 
crime.  Non-gun robberies and burglaries display a weaker response to add-on laws, but 
in the same direction, supporting the notion that add-on gun laws may have positive, not 
negative spillovers. 
While it is difficult completely rule out that passage of add-on gun laws is 
endogenous, or that contemporaneous policy changes may be responsible for some of the 
findings, I present substantial evidence addressing these concerns.  Numerous alternate 
specifications are explored to attempt to verify the robustness of the central findings.  
Contemporary newspaper data suggests that legislative action is often spurred by 
idiosyncratic crimes.  Although triple differences and lagged dependant variable 
specifications produce insignificant results, they are directionally supportive of the main 
findings.  Tests using various restricted data sets as well as different controls and time 
 36
trends, reinforce the central finding.  A Monte Carlo simulation using placebo laws was 
performed to ensure that the results were not due simply to understating standard errors. 
Previous research into deterrence has often been limited to single jurisdictions or 
unable to make use of natural experiments to establish a causal relationship.  This paper 
should solidify help solidify our evidence for deterrence from incarceration.  While the 
jurisdictions vary, it is useful to compare the magnitude of the estimates found in this 
paper with others.  The 5% three year decline in this paper is close in magnitude to the 
8% drop found by Kessler and Levitt (1999).  Since the magnitude of sentence 
enhancements in that paper are similar to gun add-ons, this is an encouraging result. 
Other papers use sentencing changes that are substantially different from those in 
this paper, and so a comparison of elasticities is more illuminating.  A quick back of the 
envelope calculation yields an elasticity of approximately -.10 in the current paper.  This 
magnitude is consistent with that found by Lee and McCrary (2009).  They bound 
allowable elasticities consistent with their data and model to have a magnitude no greater 
than -.13, although their preferred parameter values yield elasticities close to 0.  The 
largest recent empirical elasticity estimates come from Drago, et al. (2009) using Italian 
data, where they find a magnitude of -.74 for 7 months.  This may be an indication that 
the substantially lower incarceration rate in Italy makes it difficult to extrapolate to the 
United States.  A back of the envelope calculation using Helland and Tabarrok’s (2007) 
results from examining three strikes induced change yields an elasticity around -.07. 
The main finding in this paper is of a robust deterrent effect of incarceration.  As 
the preceding discussion illustrates, the magnitude of the effect found here is consistent 
with some prior results from individual jurisdictions, although there is a wide range of 
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estimates.  In looking toward future research and implications for policy, one must 
recognize that the magnitude of deterrence, and not just its existence, is paramount.
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Figure 1 
 
 
Add-on Gun Laws by Date of Enactment
Add-on Law
Repealed   (2)
Before 1970   (5)
1970 or Later  (23)
Never   (20)
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure reports two smoothed distributions of robbery sentences.  The lower mean distribution is 
that of the minimum sentence for robbery with a firearm. The higher mean distribution is that of 
the maximum sentence for robbery with a firearm.  Data collected by the author for all U.S. states 
from state statutes.
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 Figure 3 
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State Date Statute (or Bill Number)
Arizona 5/13/1974 Chapter 144
Arkansas 2/27/1981 Act 252
California 11/15/1976 Chapter 2
Colorado 5/10/1976 House Bill No. 1111
Connecticut 6/8/1993 House Bill No. 7332
Delaware 3/29/1973 Chapter 5
Florida 7/3/1974 Chapter 74-383
Georgia 4/7/1976 No. 1408
Idaho 2/25/1977 Chapter 10
Maryland 3/27/1972 Chapter 4-204
Massachusetts 8/13/1974 Chap. 830
Michigan 2/11/1976 Public Act No. 6
Missouri 6/24/1976 C.C.S.H.B. 1231, 997, 1024, 1116, 1332, and 1346
Montana 5/13/1977 Chapter 584 95-2206.17
Nevada 5/3/1973 Assembly Bill No. 234
New Hampshire 7/5/1977 Chapter 403
New York 9/17/1996 Chapter 650
North Carolina 3/26/1994 Chapter 22
Ohio 10/5/1982 Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 199
South Dakota 3/14/1985 Chapter 192
Tennessee 3/29/1976 Chapter No. 768
Utah 2/11/1976 Chapter 9
Virginia 3/24/1975 Chapter 628
Washington 3/27/1984 Chapter 209
Wyoming 3/8/1979 Chapter 158
Table 1: Dates of Passage for Add-on Gun Laws
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.13 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10)
State-specific time 
trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15516 15516 2975 2975 12979 12979 2234 2234
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.12 -0.14** -0.11** -0.08** -0.14 -0.15** -0.10** -0.06*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.10)
State-specific time 
trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15516 15516 2975 2975 12979 12979 2234 2234
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.14 -0.17** -0.13** -0.09** -0.17 -0.18** -0.11** -0.05*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.10)
State-specific time 
trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15516 15516 2975 2975 12979 12979 2234 2234
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Post MM Law Effective 
Date
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date
Post MM Law Effective 
Date
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Panel C: Three year Impact
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date
Table 2: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Log Reported Gun Robberies Per Capita
Panel A: One year Impact
Panel B: Two year Impact
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date
Post MM Law Effective 
Date
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to a llow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial composition, age composition, lagged 
police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
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Year relative to law 
effective date
-6 26.63 47.55** 0.20* 0.17**
(19.73) (14.02) (0.10) (0.05)
-5 10.35 30.44 0.13 0.12*
(24.43) (17.99) (0.09) (0.05)
-4 2.30 28.74 0.14 0.15*
(28.82) (17.06) (0.09) (0.06)
-3 16.03 47.46 0.16 0.19*
(29.19) (26.69) (0.10) (0.09)
-2 20.02 59.11* 0.18 0.24**
(31.37) (27.45) (0.11) (0.08)
-1 20.15 64.31 0.15 0.23*
(29.13) (31.10) (0.11) (0.10)
0 -2.41 46.23 0.06 0.15
(21.74) (30.92) (0.11) (0.10)
1 -15.50 34.95 -0.07 0.04
(21.85) (36.34) (0.12) (0.12)
2 -27.57 27.99 -0.20 -0.09
(23.52) (39.56) (0.14) (0.12)
3 -28.74 35.99 -0.22 -0.06
(25.48) (41.10) (0.16) (0.15)
4 -19.58 26.85 -0.16 -0.05
(30.94) (35.04) (0.17) (0.16)
5 -16.06 26.26 -0.15 -0.03
(32.14) (29.99) (0.17) (0.16)
6 -24.42 15.77 -0.23 -0.02
(31.62) (26.72) (0.15) (0.15)
State-specific time 
trends n y n y
Observations 7060 7060 7060 7060
R-squared 0.30 0.32 0.18 0.19
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 
100,000 residents
Log Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 
100,000 residents
Table 3: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Reported Gun Robberies Per Capita
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
the state level to allow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
-0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15486 15486 2964 2964 12954 12954 2223 2223
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.33 0.39 0.40
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-
on law effective date
Within two years post 
add-on law effective date
Within three years post 
add-on law effective date
Table 4: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Log Reported Gun Assaults Per Capita
Annual Reported Gun Assaults per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to allow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.01 -0.06* -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05* -0.04** -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.03 -0.09* -0.03 -0.04* -0.06 -0.06* -0.06** -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15294 15294 2911 2911 12866 12866 2209 2209
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.23
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-
on law effective date
Within two years post 
add-on law effective date
Within three years post 
add-on law effective date
Table 5: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Log Reported Non-Gun Robberies Per Capita
Annual Reported Non-Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to allow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
-0.05 -0.08** -0.06** -0.04** -0.06 -0.08** -0.05** -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.07 -0.10** -0.08** -0.06** -0.08 -0.09** -0.06** -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15516 15516 2975 2975 12979 12979 2234 2234
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.20
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-
on law effective date
Within two years post 
add-on law effective date
Within three years post 
add-on law effective date
Table 6: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Log Reported Total Robberies Per 
Annual Reported Total Robberies per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to allow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03** -0.09 -0.05 -0.04** -0.03*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.11 -0.08 -0.05* -0.04** -0.12 -0.07 -0.06** -0.05**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 15517 15517 2975 2975 12980 12980 2234 2234
R-squared 0.28 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.32 0.35 0.45 0.45
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-
on law effective date
Within two years post 
add-on law effective date
Within three years post 
add-on law effective date
Table 7: Impact of Add-on Gun Laws on Log Reported Total Burglaries Per 
Annual Reported Burglaries per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to a llow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
 
 53
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.71 -15.39 -20.32 -17.28* -3.92 -17.35 -16.90 -11.52
(1) (12.08) (10.99) (11.38) (7.81) (10.51) (12.34) (9.43) (6.40)
-0.03 -0.13** -0.11* -0.10** -0.05 -0.12* -0.10* -0.06*
(2) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.15 -0.20** -0.15** -0.09* -0.16 -0.21** -0.14** -0.08
(3) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
-0.09 -0.15** -0.12* -0.11* -0.08 -0.13* -0.11* -0.06
(4) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
-0.13 -0.17** -0.14** -0.08** -0.17 -0.17** -0.12** -0.04
(5) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.18* -0.17** -0.14** -0.10** -0.20* -0.18** -0.13** -0.07*
(6) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.14 -0.17** -0.13** -0.09** -0.17 -0.18** -0.11** -0.05*
(7) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.06** -0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.06** -0.02 0.01 0.01
(8) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 8: Addressing Confounds
Various outcomes - see notes
Polynomial Time
Trend Breaks (coefficient 
reported is trend break)
Unweighted
Reported crimes (not per 
capita)
Initial Populations
Outcome is gun robberies 
per capita (not log)
Only states ever passing 
add-on laws
State Level Data
Note - See text in Section V for more details.  The data  consists of agency-year level observations (except for the 
third row, which is state-year level).  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the state level to 
allow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all specifications.  Controls 
include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial composition, age composition, 
lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.  All point estimates are on for the impact 
of add-on gun laws within three years of the effective date.  Unless otherwise noted, dependant variable is log gun 
robberies per 100,000 residents, and independant variable is a dummy that is one within 3 years after the add-on 
gun laws effective date and zero otherwise.  Exceptions:  Outcome in row 1 is gun robberies oer 100,000 residents.  
Outcome in row 5 is log gun robberies.  Coefficients for row 8 (trend breaks) are on post-add-on*relative time 
interaction.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.04* -0.03 -0.00 -0.07* -0.03* -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.04* -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.03* -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
-0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
State-specific time trends n y n y n y n y
Balanced Panel n n y y n n y y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n n n y y y y
Observations 7839 7839 1944 1944 6542 6542 1520 1520
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.23
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-
on law effective date*add-
on term
Within two years post 
add-on law effective 
date*add-on term
Within three years post 
add-on law effective 
date*add-on term
Table 9: Triple Difference:  Impact of Add-on Term
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Note - The data consists of agency-year level observations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered 
at the state level to a llow for intra-state correlation in error structure. State and year effects are included in all 
specifications.  Controls include mandatory minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial 
composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.15 -0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.04) (0.19) (0.05)
-0.19** -0.10** -0.13 -0.10*
(0.06) (0.03) (0.13) (0.04)
-0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06
(0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
Balanced Panel n y n y
Restrict to Post-1974 n n y y
Observations 1405 290 1107 185
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0 .001 0 .016
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) .436 .979 .583 .629
Hansen over-ID test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Within one year post add-on 
law effective date
Within two years post add-on 
law effective date
Within three years post add-
on law effective date
Table 10: Lagged Dependant Variable Specification
Annual Reported Gun Robberies per 100,000 residents
Note - The data  consists of state-year level observations.  Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
estimates, one-step difference GMM results are reported.  All available lagged differences of log 
gun robberies were used.  The following were used as exogenous instruments: mandatory 
minimum law dummy, poverty rate, unemployment rate, racial composition, age composition, 
lagged police population share, and lagged imprisoned population share.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  Hansen J statistic for overidentifying restrictions, and Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation are reported.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date -1.68 -1.61 -1.19 -0.59 -1.28 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07
Robust standard errors (0.52)** (0.57) (0.53)* (0.25)* (0.60)* (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)* (0.03)* (0.07)
Placebo standard errors [1.00] [1.02] [0.99] [0.83] [0.79]* [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]* [0.10]
State Fixed Effects n n n y n n n n y n
Time Trend n y y n n n y y n n
Post-74 Dummy n n y n n n n y n n
Year Dummies n n n n y n n n n y
Balanced Panel y y y y y y y y y y
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 573 573 573 573 573
R-squared 0.48 0.51 0.63 0.88 0.74 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.88 0.64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date -2.72** -2.53** -1.86* -0.97* -1.50 -0.34** -0.31** -0.24** -0.17** -0.11
Robust standard errors (0.64)** (0.68)** (0.67)* (0.35)* (0.83) (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.04)** (0.08)
Placebo standard errors [1.03] [1.12] [1.07] [0.86] [0.97]* [0.12]* [0.13]* [0.12]* [0.10]* [0.14]
State Fixed Effects n n n y n n n n y n
Time Trend n y y n n n y y n n
Post-74 Dummy n n y n n n n y n n
Year Dummies n n n n y n n n n y
Balanced Panel y y y y y y y y y y
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147
R-squared 0.49 0.52 0.61 0.85 0.69 0.49 0.52 0.58 0.86 0.66
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post Add-on Law 
Effective Date -3.59 -3.20 -2.24 -1.35 -1.21 -0.45 -0.39 -0.30 -0.25 -0.12
Robust standard errors (0.80)** (0.77)** (0.79)** (0.44)** (0.94) (0.11)** (0.08)** (0.10)** (0.06)** (0.10)
Placebo standard errors [1.27] [1.29]* [1.24] [0.96] [1.17] [0.13] [0.14]** [0.14]* [0.10]* [0.16]
State Fixed Effects n n n y n n n n y n
Time Trend n y y n n n y y n n
Post-74 Dummy n n y n n n n y n n
Year Dummies n n n n y n n n n y
Balanced Panel y y y y y y y y y y
Observations 1722 1722 1722 1722 1722 1716 1716 1716 1716 1716
R-squared 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.78 0.65 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.82 0.65
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Monthly Reported Gun Robberies per 
100,000 residents
Monthly Log Reported Gun 
Robberies per 100,000 residents
Panel B: Two year Impact
Monthly Reported Gun Robberies per 
100,000 residents
Monthly Log Reported Gun 
Robberies per 100,000 residents
Table 11: Monte Carlo Standard Error Calculation
Panel A: One year Impact
Monthly Reported Gun Robberies per 
100,000 residents
Monthly Log Reported Gun 
Robberies per 100,000 residents
State level Data
Panel C: Three year Impact
Note - The data consists of state-month level observations. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered at the state level to allow for intra-state correlation in error structure.  Controls include poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, racial composition, age composition, lagged police population share, and lagged 
imprisoned population share.  The calculation method for bootstrap standard errors in brackets is described in 
the text.  
